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AOTEAROA - NEW ZEALAND
“Race relations” and the place of the Treaty of Waitangi as a blueprint
for nation building were very much at the forefront of the national
political agenda in 2004. The broad political consensus shared by both
National and Labour-led governments in New Zealand over the past
decade collapsed in the wake of the soaring political popularity of Don
Brash, the new leader of the National Party, the main opposition political party in the New Zealand Parliament.
The legitimacy of policy initiatives and programmes that specifically target Mãori in order to reduce the relative socio-economic disparities that exist between indigenous communities and other New
Zealanders, and the role of the Treaty of Waitangi in managing contemporary relationships between indigenous communities and the
Crown, have come under sustained attack.

The Treaty of Waitangi under threat
The underlying theme of Brash’s widely reported speech to the Orewa
Rotary Club in January 2004 was the apparent “threat” that the Treaty
of Waitangi settlement process represented for the future of the country. Throughout the speech he repeatedly emphasised what he claimed
was “a dangerous drift to racial separatism” which undermined “the
essential notion of one rule for all in a single nation state”. In a move
clearly designed to tap into public resentment, Brash argued that the
Treaty of Waitangi was an archaic relic of the past, and on that basis
should possess no more than a symbolic role in New Zealand society.
- and
In rejecting notions of the Crown’s “partnership” with iwi, hapu
urban Mãori communities, Brash has clearly signified that a return to
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1. Taitokerau
2. Tainui
3. Arawa
4. Mataatua
5. Taira Whiti
6. Takitimu
7. Te Upoko O Te Ika
8. Manawatu
9. Whanganui
10. Taranaki
11. Te Tau Ihu
Regional iwi groupings.
Source: www.takoa.co.nz

more traditional constitutional concerns is on the cards should the National Party be in a position to form a government at the next election:
We intend to remove divisive race-based features from legislation. The
“principles of the Treaty” – never clearly defined yet ever expanding – are
the thin end of a wedge leading to a racially divided state and we want no
part of that. There can be no basis for special privileges for any race, no
basis for government funding based on race, no basis for introducing Maori
wards in local authority elections, and no obligation for local governments
to consult Maori in preference to other New Zealanders. We will remove
the anachronism of the Maori seats in Parliament. … Having done all that,
we really will be one people – as Hobson declared us to be in 1840.1
Stung by the strong public support for Brash in recent opinion polls,
the Labour-led government announced a series of abrupt U-turns,
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hoping to placate the concerns of the wider electorate. In a concession
to the publicity generated by Don Brash, Prime Minister Helen Clark is
reported as saying that the government may have moved ahead of
public opinion on Treaty issues. This follows the appointment of State
Services Minister, Trevor Mallard, to a new role as “Co-ordinating
Minister of Race Relations” to undertake a comprehensive review of
policy initiatives and programmes that specifically target Mãori, and
an examination of legislative references to the principles of the Treaty
of Waitangi. This has occurred amidst calls for an inquiry into constitutional arrangements, including the place of the Treaty of Waitangi.
References to the Treaty of Waitangi in state legislation represent a
significant concession after years of concerted struggle by Mãori to
combat the racism that has underpinned New Zealand society and the
discriminatory practices of state institutions. The ideological battle
against the specific programmes and initiatives that target Mãori communities as a symbol of this victory has been raging ever since – as
opponents claim the mantle of the anti-racist movement in their battle
against “reverse racism” towards Pãkehã. Far from a “level playing
field”, as opponents of affirmative action claim, racism is a pervasive
force in New Zealand society. Programmes that consciously address
this racism are absolutely critical.
The impact of Brash’s Orewa speech, however, has been to make
the expression of the bigoted and racist ideas of some New Zealanders
publicly respectable. Brash has provided them with a more acceptable
political figure to hide behind, while the attacks on Mãori, implicit in
his public pronouncements, represent a tacit coded appeal to cruder
racist attitudes. It is not simply coincidental that the fascist organization, the National Front, is seeking registration as a political party for
next year’s elections on the basis that the “public mood is right for its
militarist and anti-immigrant stance”.2

Foreshore and seabed
On 18 November 2004, one of the most contentious and draconian
pieces of state legislation was passed by 66 votes to 53 in the New Zea-
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land parliament. The Foreshore and Seabed Act was largely a response to
the controversy that erupted over a Court of Appeal decision in June
2003 that challenged the Crown’s long-held assertion that it owned the
foreshore and seabed. The Court found that Mãori may have customary interests in the foreshore, which could lead to the granting of private title by the Mãori Land Court.
Against a background of growing public hysteria, fuelled in part by
cynical political opportunism and sensationalised media reports that
Mãori would block off public access to the beaches, the government
released its initial plans for the foreshore and seabed in December
2003. The policy entailed introducing new legislation that would effectively extinguish Mãori customary rights in the coastal marine area.
The government then embarked on a process of “consultation”. Despite the fact that Mãori overwhelmingly rejected the government’s
proposals, the government did not alter its proposed approach.
In January 2004, the Waitangi Tribunal’s Report on the Crown’s
Seabed and Foreshore Policy condemned the government’s policy as
being in substantial breach of the Treaty of Waitangi:
The policy clearly breaches the Treaty of Waitangi. But beyond the Treaty, the
policy fails in terms of the wider norms of domestic and international law
that underpin good government in a modern democratic state. These include
the rule of law, and principles of fairness and non-discrimination. 3

Protest and the formation of the Mãori Party
The lack of accountability and democracy in the negotiations over the
foreshore and seabed legislation generated intense anger and resentment. On 5 May 2004, a protest hikoi (a walk or march) arrived in Wellington with up to 20,000 people who strongly opposed the government’s plans. The hikoi, the largest protest since the land rights movement of the 1970s, had set off from the Far North of New Zealand’s
North Island thirteen days earlier, picking up thousands of supporters
as it marched towards the nation’s capital. The government’s Mãori
MPs came in for heavy flak and many speakers reignited the call for a
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Mãori party to be established, saying it was the only vehicle for Mãori
political aspirations. The Prime Minister, Helen Clark, tried to marginalise the hikoi, describing the marchers as “haters and wreckers”.
The government’s proposals on ownership of the foreshore and
seabed also exposed bitter internal divisions amongst the Mãori members of the governing Labour Party itself. The Associate Maori Affairs
Minister, Tariana Turia, announced her resignation from Parliament
and the Labour Party over the issue. With growing dissatisfaction with
the Labour government among Mãori voters, Turia was critical in establishing a new Mãori party to contest the next general parliamentary
elections. As co-leader of the Mãori party, Turia subsequently re-won
her Te Tai Hauauru constituency (a Mãori constituency stretching from
Putaruru and Tokoroa in the north to Porirua in the south) in a by-election in July 2004, winning around 90 per cent of the votes cast.
Despite this, the Foreshore and Seabed Act will come into effect on
17 January 2005 and vests all parts of the foreshore and seabed not currently “subject to a specified freehold interest” in the Crown “as its
absolute property”. The Act has radically changed the legal situation
in New Zealand in relation to Mãori customary rights and customary
ownership of land characterised as foreshore and seabed. It prevents
Mãori from access to judicial recourse by removing existing legal routes
for Mãori to have their customary rights and ownership in the foreshore
and seabed investigated and legally recognised. The government is actively disregarding the customary rights that were guaranteed under
the Treaty of Waitangi and which are also recognised in international
law. In this way, the legislation represents an unparalleled attack on the
rights of iwi, hapu- and urban Mãori communities.
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